I’ve been spending this week at a workshop on governing new and emerging digital technologies, organised by the Open Government Partnership, in Nairobi, Kenya.
Over the first 1.5 days we had the great privilege to hear from civil society and government presenters from across 11 countries about current digital governance actions, agendas and challenges.Then our focus turned to prospective future open government and digital governance actions, working in country clusters.
The current UK Open Government National Action Plan which runs 2024 – 2025 notes that while “there are currently no commitments on climate change or digital governance … we look forward to pursuing these in the next plan”. Below I’ve tried to capture some of the potential themes for UK focus that came up in the discussion. These are shared (in no official capacity – simply as an independent civil society attendee at the workshop) not as fully-formed proposals, but as rough outlines that could be explored more, and discussed to see whether any deserve a little more colouring in.
An Open Government mission in a renewed Roadmap for Digital and Data
With the current UK Roadmap for Digital and Data (based around six ‘missions’ for government digital) also running until the end of 2025, the UK Open Government process could provide an opportunity to feed public priorities into the roadmap, or call for a mission that better embeds open government values of Transparency, Participation and Accountability into the roadmap.
Embedding Transparency, Participation and Accountability in AI Governance
We face not so much a shortage of evidence on public attitudes on AI in general, or on public perspectives about particular applications of AI in public services, as we face a gulf between the places where public engagement is happening, and the places where the promotion and governance of AI are taking place.
Some of the recent feedback I’ve heard on the Perspectives on the AI Fringe report has highlighted the value that having a public perspectives chapter (from the People’s Panel on AI) has had. Building on this – could we not be asking that the reports of the AI Safety Institute should include a public perspectives chapter, and that central government experiments with AI should demonstrate how they have either built on existing relevant public engagement, or carried out direct engagement with affected communities during the innovation process?
Other areas for action
Drawing on both our country discussions, and listening to action plan ideas from other countries at the workshop, there are a number of other ideas that could be in the mix (though I’ve not worked up these more than a bullet point right now):
Improving public input into AI procurement processes either at the national level, and/or by providing frameworks and support for greater participatory practice around AI procurement in local public services.
One of the OGP speakers earlier today reflected on the journey towards strong actions and commitments: noting the need to build civil society and government coalitions around particular actions, and to find the champions. It’s notable that the UK Roadmap for Digital and Data adopts a mission-oriented approach that names responsible government stakeholders.
One of the key challenges then for the multi-stakeholder groups around open government in the UK is not to wait for the next national action plan cycle to start, but to be thinking now (albeit accepting possible temporary election distractions…) about building conversations and coalitions that might own and advance improved digital governance commitments in future.
I was involved in civil society aspects of developing of the UK’s 2nd and 3rd NAPs, and have written critiques of the others, so, although I’ve had minimal involvement in this NAP (I attended a few of the online engagement sessions, mainly on procurement transparency commitments, before they appeared to peter out) I thought I should try and unpack this one in the same kind of way.
By way of context, it’s a very tough time to be trying to advance the open government agenda in the UK. With Sue Gray’s report, and Prime Ministerial responses to it today, confirming the lack of integrity and the culture of dishonesty at the very centre of Number 10; just over a week after a ministerial resignation at the despatch box over government failures to manage billions of pounds of fraud during the COVID response; and on the day that government promised to pursue a post-Brexit deregulatory agenda; we have rarely faced a greater need, yet a less hospitable environment, for reforms that can strengthen checks and balances on government power, reduce space for corrupt behaviour, and bring citizens into dialogue about solving pressing environmental, social and political problems. As a key Cabinet Office civil servant notes, it’s a credit to all involved from the civil service and civil society, that the NAP was published at all in such difficult circumstances. But, although the plans’ publication shows that embers of open government are still there in Whitehall, the absence of a ministerial foreword, the lack of ambition in the plan, and the apparent lack of departmental ownership for the commitments it does contain (past plans listed the responsible stakeholder for commitments; this one does not), suggests that the status of open government in the UK, and the political will to take action on government reform within the international framework of the OGP, has fallen even further than in 2019.
When I wrote about the 2019 plan, I concluded that “The Global OGP process is doing very little to spur on UK action”. Since then, the UK has been called out and placed under review by the OGP Criteria & Standards Subcommittee in 2021 for missing action plan deadlines, and falling short of minimum requirements for public involvement in NAP development. Today’s published plan appears to admit that not enough has yet been done to rectify this, noting that:
In order to meet this criteria the government will amend and develop the initial commitment areas in NAP5 with civil society over the course of 2022.
Notably, past promises to civil society of adding to commitments to the NAP after the OGP deadline were not met (in part, if I recall correctly, because of issues with how this would interact with the OGP’s Independent Review Mechanism process), and so, with this line, civil society have a tactical choice to make: whether to engage in seeking to secure updates to the plan with assurance these will be taken forward, or whether to focus on ‘outsider’ strategies to put pressure on future UK OGP engagement. As Gavin Freeguard writes, we may be running up against the limits of “a one-size-fits-all international process that can’t possibly fit into the rhythms and rituals of UK government”. If this is so, then there is a significant challenge ahead to find any other drivers that can help secure meaningful open governance reforms in the UK: recognising that the coming years may be as much about the work of shoring up, and repair, as about securing grand new commitments.
A look at NAP5 commitments
Given the wider context, it hardly seems worth offering a critique of the individual commitments (but, erm, I ended up writing one anyway…) . It’s certainly difficult to extract any sense of a SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-bound) milestone from any of them, and those that do appear to have some sort of measurable target betray a woeful lack of ambition*.
Take for example “publishing 90% of ‘above threshold’ contract awards within 90 days calendar days [of award presumably]”. Not only does that leave absolutely massive loopholes (any contract that it would be convenient not to publish could fall into the 10%; and 90-days takes disclosure of information on awards far beyond the period during which economic operators who lose out on a bid could be able to challenge a decision), but, this is more or less a commitment rolled over from the last National Action Plan. Surely, with the learning from the last few years of procurement scandals, and learning from the fact that Open Contracting commitments from the past have been poorly implemented, a credible National Action Plan would be calling for wholesale reform of procurement publication, following other OGP members who make award publication a binding part of a contract being enforceable, or invoices against it payable?
(*To be clear: I believe the vast majority of the fault for this lies with Ministers, not with the other individuals inside and outside government who have engaged in the NAP process in good faith).
with internal and external stakeholders to gauge the feasibility of conducting a scoping exercise focused on mapping existing legal requirements for appeal mechanisms, for example due to administrative law, data protection law, or domain-specific legislation; with a view to sharing this information with the public. [my emphasis]
If I’m reading this right that could well be: a conversation with unspecified stakeholders to gauge whether it’s even possible to work out the scope of a mapping that then may or may not take place, may nor may not be comprehensive, and may or may not result in outputs shared with the public. Even read more charitably (let’s assume the scoping exercise involves the mapping. not just scopes it!), surely the point of the National Action Plan development process is have the conversations with internal and external stakeholders to ‘gauge the feasibility’ of an open government action taking place?
Others have commented on the backsliding in commitments to Open Justice, and I’ll leave it to those more involved at present in combatting the UK’s role in Illicit Financial Flows to comment on the limited new commitments there. However, I do want to pick up two comments on the health section in the NAP. Firstly, while inclusion of health within the NAP, as a topic much more legible in many people’s daily lives (and not only in the last two years) than topics like procurement or stolen asset recovery, is broadly welcome, the health section betrays a worrying lack of distinction between:
• Patient data;
• Health system data;
The State of Open Data: Histories and Horizon’s chapter on Health offers a useful model for thinking about this. In general, Open Government should be concerned with planning and operational data, service information, and research outputs. Where open government and personal data meet, it should be about the protection of individuals data rights: recognising elements of citizen privacy as foundational for open government.
In practice, when we talk of transparency, we need to be very clear to distinguish transparency about how (personal) health data is used (generally a good thing), and transparency of (personal) health data (usually a sign that something has gone profoundly wrong with data protection!). To talk about transparency of health data without qualifiers risks messy policy making, and undermining trust in both open government and health data practices. After reading it over a few times, I *think* ‘Objective 1: accountability and transparency’ under the health heading is about being transparent and accountable about how data is used, but there is little room for sloppy drafting in these matters. The elision of agendas to create large health datasets (with mixed public and private-sector users), with the open government agenda, has been something civil society have had to be consistently watchful of in the history of UK NAPs, and it appears this time around is no different.
Secondly, and perhaps related, it’s not at all clear to me why a a “standards and interoperability strategy for adoption across health and adult social care” (under Health ‘Objective 2: Data standards and interoperability’) belongs in an Open Government National Action Plan. Sure, the UK health system could benefit from greater interoperability of clinical systems, and this might have an impact on patient welfare. But the drivers for this are not open government: they are patient care. And an OGP National Action Plan is going to do little to move the needle on a challenge that the health sector has been tackling for decades (I recall conversations around the dining room table with my Dad, then an NHS manager, twenty years ago, about the latest initiatives then to move towards standardised models for interoperable patient data and referrals).
It might seem hair-splitting to say that certain reforms to government fall outside the scope of open government, but for the concept to be meaningful it can’t mean all and any reform of government systems. If we were talking about ways of engaging citizens in the design process for interoperability standards, and thinking critically about the political and social impact that categorisations within health records have, we might have something worthy of an open government plan, but we don’t. Instead, we have an uncritical focus on centralising data, and a development approach that will only involve “vendors, suppliers, digital technologists, app developers and the open source community”, but not actual care-service users, or people affected by the system design*.
(*I know that in practice there are many fantastic service and technology designers around the NHS who are both critically aware of the cost and benefit tradeoffs of health system interoperability, and a personal/professional commitment to work with service users in all design work; but the absence of service-users from the text of the NAP commitment is notable.)
Lastly, the plan includes a placeholder for forthcoming commitments on “Local transparency”, to be furnished by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) sometime in 2022. In past rounds of the NAP, civil society published a clear vision for the commitments they would like to see under certain headings, and the NAP has named the civil society partners working to develop and monitor commitments. Not this time around it seems. Whilst OGP colleagues in Northern Ireland have been running workshops to talk about open local government, I can’t find evidence of any conversations that might show what might fall under this heading when, or if, the current Westminster NAP evolves.
Still looking for a way forward…
As I wrote in 2019, I generally prefer my blogging (and engagement) to be constructive: but that’s not been easy recent Open Government processes in the UK. At the same time, I did leave a recent session on ‘The (Absolute) State of Open Government’ at the latest UKOpenGovCamp unconference feeling surprisingly optimistic. Whilst any political will from the Conservative government for meaningful open government is, at least at present, sorely lacking, open working cultures within some pockets of government seem to have been remarkably resilient, and even appear to have deepened over the course of the pandemic. The people of open government are still there, even if the political leadership and policies are missing in action.
All the ambitious, necessary, practical and SMART commitment ideas that didn’t make it into this NAP need to be implementation-ready for any openings for reform that may come in the volatile near-future of UK politics. Just as civil society successfully used the UK’s Chairmanship and hosting of the OGP Summit back in 2012/13 to lock in stronger open beneficial ownership data commitments, civil society needs to be ready with ideas that, while they may get no traction right now, might find an audience, moment and leverage in future – at least if we manage to protect and renew our currently fragile democratic system.
I’ve long said that the OGP should be a space for the UK to learn from other countries: forgoing ideas of UK exceptionalism, and recognising that polities across the world have grapled with the kinds of problems of populist and unaccountable leadership we’re currently facing. As I work on finalising the Global Data Barometer Report, I’ll be personally paying particular attention to the ideas and examples from colleagues across OGP civil society that are particularly relevant to learn from.
And if you are in anyway way interested in open government in the UK, even though the process right now feels rather stuck and futile, you can sign-up to the UK civil society Open Government Network mailing list to be ready to get involved in revitalising open government action in the UK when the opportunity is there (or, perhaps, when we collectively make it arise).
[Summary: extended notes from an unConference session]
At the recent data literacy focussed Open Government Partnership unConference day (ably facilitated by my fellowStroudieDirk Slater) I acted as host for a break-out discussion on ‘Artificial Intelligence and Data Literacy’, building on the‘Algorithms and AI’ chapter I contributed toThe State of Open Data book.
In that chapter, I offer the recommendation that machine learning should be addressed within wider open data literacy building. However, it was only through the unConference discussions that we found a promising approach to take that recommendation forward: encouraging a critical look at how AI might be applied at each stage of the School of Data ‘Data Pipeline’.
The Data Pipeline, which features in theData Literacy chapter of The State of Open Data, describes seven stages for woking with data, from defining the problem to be addressed, through to finding and getting hold of relevant data, verifying and cleaning it, and analysing data and presenting findings.
Often, AI is described as a tool for data analysis (any this was the mental framework many unConference session participants started with). Yet, in practice, AI tools might play a role at each stage of the data pipeline, and exploring these different applications of AI could support a more critical understanding of the affordances, and limitations, of AI.
The following rough worked example looks at how this could be applied in practice, using an imagined case study to illustrate the opportunities to build AI literacy along the data pipeline.
(Note: although I’ll use machine-learning and AI broadly interchangeably in this blog post, as Ioutline in the State of Open Data Chapter, AI is a broader concept than machine-learning.)
Worked example
Imagine a human rights organisation, using a media-monitoring service to identify emerging trends that they should investigate. The monitoring service flags a spike in gender based violence, encouraging them to seek out more detailed data. Their research locates a mix of social media posts, crowdsourced data from a harassment mapping platform, and official statistics collected in different regions across the country. They bring this data together, and seek to check it’s accuracy, before producing an analysis and visually impactful report.
As we unpack this (fictional) example, we can consider how algorithms and machine-learning are, or could be, applied at each stage – and we can use that to consider the strengths and weaknesses of machine-learning approaches, building data and AI literacy.
Define – The patterns that first give rise to a hunch or topic to investigate may have been identified by an algorithmic model. How does this fit with, or challenge, the perception of staff or community members? If there is a mis-match – is this because the model is able to spot a pattern than humans were not able to see (+1 for the AI)? Or could it be because the model is relying on input data that reflects certain bias (e.g. media may under-report certain stories, or certain stories may be over-reported because of certaincognitive biases amongst reporters)?
Find – Search engine algorithms may be applying machine-learning approaches to identify and rank results. Machine-translation tools, that could be used to search for data described in other languages, are also an example of really well established AI. Consider the accuracy of search engines and machine-translation: they are remarkable tools, but we also recognise that they are nowhere near 100% reliable. We still generally rely on a human to sift through the results they give.
Get – One of the most common, and powerful, applications of machine-learning, is in turning information into data: taking unstructured content, and adding structure through classification or data extraction. For example, image classification algorithms can be trained to convert complex imagery into a dataset of terms or descriptions; entity extraction and sentiment analysis tools can be used to pick out place names, event descriptions and a judgement on whether the event described is good or bad, from free text tweets, and data extraction algorithms can (in some cases) offer a much faster and cheaper way to transcribe thousands of documents than having humans do the work by hand. AI can, ultimately, change what counts as structured data or not. However, that doesn’t mean that you can get all the data you need using AI tools. Sometimes, particularly where well-defined categorical data is needed, getting data may require creation of new reporting tools, definitions and data standards.
Verify – School of Data describe the verification step like this: “We got our hands in the data, but that doesn’t mean it’s the data we need. We have to check out if details are valid, such as the meta-data, the methodology of collection, if we know who organised the dataset and it’s a credible source.” In the context of AI-extracted data, this offers an opportunity to talk about training data and test data, and to think about the impact that tuning tolerances to false-positives or false-negatives might have on the analysis that will be carried out. It also offers an opportunity to think about the impact that different biases in the data might have on any models built to analyse it.
Clean – When bringing together data from multiple sources, there may be all sorts of errors and outliers to address. Machine-learning tools may prove particularly useful for de-duplication of data, or spotting possible outliers. Data cleaning to prepare data for a machine-learning based analysis may also involve simplifying a complex dataset into a smaller number of variables and categories. Working through this process can help build an understanding of the ways in which, before a model is applied, certain important decisions have already been made.
Analyse – Often, data analysis takes the form of simple descriptive charts, graphs and maps. But, when AI tools are added to the mix, analysis might involve building predictive models, able, for example, to suggest areas of a county that might see future hot-spots of violence, or that create interactive tools that can be used to perform ongoing monitoring of social media reports. However, it’s important in adding AI to the analysis toolbox, not to skip entirely over other statistical methods: and instead to think about the relative strengths and weaknesses of a machine-learning model as against some other form of statistical model. One of the key issues to consider in algorithmic analysis is the ’n’ required: that is, the sample size needed to train a model, or to get accurate results. It’s striking that many machine-learning techniques required a far larger dataset that can be easily supplied outside big corporate contexts. A second issue that can be considered in looking at analysis is how ‘explainable’ a model is: does the machine-learning method applied allow an exploration of the connections between input and output? Or is it only a black box.
Present – Where the output of conventional data analysis might be a graph or a chart describing a trend, the output of a machine-learning model may be a prediction. Where a summary of data might be static, a model could be used to create interactive content that responds to user input in some way. Thinking carefully about the presentation of the products of machine-learning based analysis could support a deeper understanding of the ways in which such outputs could or should be used to inform action.
The bullets above give just some (quickly drafted and incomplete) examples of how the data pipeline can be used to explore AI-literacy alongside data literacy. Hopefully, however, this acts as enough of a proof-of-concept to suggest this might warrant further development work.
The benefit of teaching AI literacy through open data
I also argue in The State of Open Data that:
AI approaches often rely on centralising big datasets and seeking to personalise services through the application of black-box algorithms. Open data approaches can offer an important counter-narrative to this, focusing on both big and small data and enabling collective responses to social and developmental challenges.
Operating well in a datified world requires citizens to have a critical appreciation of a wide variety of ways in which data is created, analysed and used – and the ability to judge which tool is appropriate to which context. By introducing AI approaches as one part of the wider data toolbox, it’s possible to build this kind of literacy in ways that are not possible in training or capacity building efforts focussed on AI alone.
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) Summit is, on many levels, an inspiring event. Civil society and government in dialogue together on substantive initiatives to improve governance, address civic engagement, and push forward transparency and accountability reforms. I’ve had the privilege, through various projects, to be a civil society participant in each of the 6 summits in Brasilia, London, Mexico, Paris, Tbilisi and now Ottawa. I have a lot of respect for the OGP Support Unit team, and the many government and civil society participants who work to make OGP a meaningful forum and mechanism for change. And I recognise that the substance of a summit is often found in the smaller sessions, rather than the set-piece plenaries. But,the summit’s opening plenary offered a powerful example of the way in which a continued embrace of a tech-goggles approach at OGP, and weaknesses in the design of the partnership and it’s events, misdirect attention, and leave some of the biggest open government challenges unresolved.
Trudeau’s Tech Goggles?
We need to call out the techno-elitism, and political misdirection, that meanthe Prime Minister of Canada can spend the opening plenary in an interview that focussed more on regulation of Facebook, than on regulation of the money flowing into politics; and more time answering questions about his Netflix watching, than discussing the fact that millions of people still lack the connectivity, social capital or civic space to engage in any meaningful form of democratic decision making. Whilst (new-)media inevitably plays a role in shaping patterns of populism, a narrow focus on the regulation of online platforms directs attention away from the ways in which economic forces, transportation policy, and a relentless functionalist focus on ‘efficient’ public services, without recognising their vital role in producing social-solidarity,has contributed to the social dislocation in which populism (and fascism) finds root.
Of course, the regulation of large technology firms matters, but it’s ultimately an implementation detail that some come as part of wider reforms to our democratic systems. The OGP should not be seeking to become the Internet Governance Forum (and if it does want to talk tech regulation, then it should start by learning lessons from the IGFs successes and failures), but should instead be looking deeper at the root causes of closing civic space, and of the upswing of populist, non-participatory, and non-inclusive politics.
…authoritarianism is on the rise again. The current wave is different–it is more gradual and less direct than in past eras. Today, challenges to democracy come less frequently from vote theft or military coups; they come from persistent threats to activists and journalists, the media, and the rule of law.
The threats to democracy are coming from outside of the electoral process and our response must be found there too. Both the problem and the solution lie “beyond the ballot box.”
There appears to be a non-sequitur here. That votes are not being stolen through physical coercion, does not mean that we should immediately move our focus beyond electoral processes. Much like the Internet adage that ‘censorship is damage, route around it’, there can be a tendency in Open Government circles to treat the messy politics of governing as a fundamentally broken part of government, and to try and create alternative systems of participation or engagement that seek to be ‘beyond politics’. Yet, if new systems of participation come to have meaningful influence, what reason do we have to think they won’t become subject to the legitimate and illegitimate pressures that lead to deadlock or ‘inefficiency’ in our existing institutions? And as I know from local experience, citizen scrutiny of procurement or public sending from outside government can only get us so far without political representatives willing to use and defend they constitutional powers of scrutiny.
I’m more and more convinced that to fight back against closing civic space and authoritarian government, we cannot work around the edges: but need to think more deeply about about how we work to get capable and ethical politicians elected: held in check by functioning party systems, and engaging in fair electoral competition overseen by robust electoral institutions. We need to go back to the ballot box, rather than beyond it. Otherwise we are simply ceding ground to the forces who have progressively learnt to manipulate elections, without needing to directly buy votes.
Globally leaders, locally laggards?
The opening plenary also featured UK Government Minister John Penrose MP. But, rather than making even passing mention of the UK’s OGP National Action Plan, launched just one day before, Mr Penrose talked about UK support for global beneficial ownership transparency. Now: it is absolutely great that that ideas of beneficial ownership transparency are gaining pace through the OGP process.
But, there is a design flaw in a multi-stakeholder partnership where a national politician of a member country is able to take the stage without any response from civil society. And where there is no space for questions on the fact that the UK government has delayed the extension of public beneficial ownership registries to UK Overseas Territories until at least 2023. The misdirection, and #OpenWashing at work here needs to be addressed head on: demanding honest reflections from a government minister on the legislative and constitutional challenges of extending beneficial ownership transparency to tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions.
As long as politicians and presenters are not challenged when framing reforms as simple (and cheap) technological fixes, we will cease to learn about and discuss the deeper legal reforms needed, and the work needed on implementation. As our State of Open Data session on Friday explored: data and standards must be the means not the ends, and more public scepticism about techno-determinist presentations would be well warranted.
Back, however, to event design. Although when hosted in London, the OGP Summit offered UK civil society at least, an action-forcing moment to push forward substantive National Action Plan commitments, the continued disappearance of performative spaces in which governments account for their NAPs, ordifferent stakeholders from a countries multi-stakeholder group share the stage, means that (wealthy, and northern) governments are put in control of the spin.
Grounds for hope?
It’s clear that very many of us understand that open government ≠ technology, at least if (irony noted) likes and RTs on the below give a clue.
#ogpCanada Can we just agree that Open Gov ≠ Technology once and for all. This is the OGP Summit – not the Internet Governance Forum. Let’s talk about regulation of money in politics & creating democratic and civic space. Treat the technical platforms as implementation detail.
But we need to hone our critical instincts to apply that understanding to more of the discussions in fora like OGP. And if, as the Canadian Co-Chair argued in closing, “OGP is developing a new forms of multilateralism”, civil society needs to be much more assertive in taking control of the institutional and event design of OGP Summits, to avoid this being simply a useful annual networking shin-dig. The closing plenary also included calls to take seriously threats to civic space: but how can we make sure we’re not just saying this from the stage in the closing, but that the institutional design ensures there are mechanisms for civil society to push forward action on this issue.
In looking to the future of OGP, we should consider how civil society spends some time taking technology off the table. Let it emerge as an implementation detail, but perhaps let’s see where we get when we don’t let techo-discussions lead?
Yesterday the UK Government published, a year late, it’s most recent Open Government Partnership National Action Plan. It would be fair to say that civil society expectations for the plan were low, but when you look beyond the fine words to the detail of the targets set, the plan appears tolimbo under even the lowest of expectations.
For example, although the Ministerial foreword acknowledges that “The National Action Plan is set against the backdrop of innovative technology being harnessed to erode public trust in state institutions, subverting and undermining democracy, and enabling the irresponsible use of personal information.”, the furthest the plan goes in relation to these issues is a weak commitment to “maintain an open dialogue with data users and civil society to support the development of the Government’s National Data Strategy.” This commitment has supposedly been ‘ongoing’ since September 2018, yet try as I might to find any public documentation of how the government is engaging around the data strategy – I’m drawing a blank. Not to mention that there is absolutely zilch here about actually tackling the ways in which we see democracy being subverted, not only through use of technology, but also through government’s own failures to respond to concerns about the management of elections or to bring forward serious measures to tackle the illegal flow of money into party and referendum campaigning. For work on open government to be meaningful we have to take off the tech-goggles, and address the very real governanceand compliance challenges harming democracy in the UK. This plan singularly fails at that challenge.
In short, this is a plan with nothing new; with very few measurable targets that can be used to hold government to account; and with a renewed conflation of open data and open government.
Commitment 3 on Open Policy Making, to “Deliver at least 4 Open Policy Making demonstrator projects” have suspicious echoes of the 2013 commitment 16 to run “at least five ‘test and demonstrate projects’ across different policy areas.”. If central government has truly “led by example” on “increasingly citizen participation” as the introduction to this plan claims, then it seems all we are every going to get are ad-hoc examples. Evidence of any systemic action to promote engagement is entirely absent.The recent backsliding on public engagement in the UK vividly underscored by the fact that commitment 8 includes responding by November 2019 to a 2016 consultation. Agile, iterative and open government this is not.
Commitment 6 on an ‘Innovation in Democracy Programme’ involves token funding to allow a few local authority areas to pilot ‘Area Democracy Forums’, based on a citizens assembly models – at the same time that the government refuses to support any sort of participatory citizen dialogue to deal with pressing issue of both Brexit and Climate Change. The contract to deliver this work has already been tendered in any case, and the only targets in the plan relate to ‘pilots delivered’ and ‘evaluation’. Meaningful targets that might track how far progress has been made in actually giving citizens power over decisions making are notably absent.
The most substantive targets can be found under commitments 4 and 5 on Open Contracting and Natural Resource Transparency (full disclosure: most of the Open Contracting targets come from draft content I wrote when a member of the UK Open Contracting Steering Group). If Government actually follows through on the commitment to “Report regularly on publication of contract documents, and extent of redactions.”, and this reporting leads to better compliance with the policy requirements to disclose contracts, there may even be something approaching transformative here. But, the plan suggests such a commitment to quarterly reporting should have been in place since the start of the year, and I’ve not yet tracked down any such report.
Overall these commitments are about house-keeping: moving forward a little on the compliance with policy requirements that should have been met long ago. By contrast, the one draft commitment that could have substantively moved forward Open Contracting in the UK, by shifting emphasis to the local level where there is greatest scope to connect contracting and citizen engagement, is the one commitment conspicuously dropped from the final National Action Plan.Similarly, whilst the plan does provide space for some marginal improvements in grants data (Commitment 1), this is simply a continuation of existing commitments.
I recognise that civil servants have had to work long and hard to get even this limited NAP through government given the continued breakdown normal Westminster operations. However, as I look back to the critique we wrote of the first UK OGP NAP back in 2012, it seems to me that we’re back where we started or even worse: with a government narrative that equates open government and open data, and a National Action Plan that repackages existing work without any substantive progress or ambition. And we have to consider when something so weak is actually worse than nothing at all.
I resigned my place on the UK Open Government Network Steering Group last summer: partly due to my own capacity, but also because of frustration at stalled progress, and the co-option of civil society into a process where, instead of speaking boldly about the major issues facing our public sphere, the focus has been put on marginal pilots or small changes to how data is published. It’s not that those things are unimportant in and of themselves: but if we let them define what open government is about – well, then we have lost what open government should have been about.
And even we do allow the OGP to have a substantial emphasis on open data, where the UK government continues to claim leadership, the real picture is not so rosy. I’ll quote from Rufus Pollock and Danny Lämmerhirt’s analysis of the UK in their chapter for the State of Open Data:
“Open data lost most of its momentum in late 2015 as government attention turned to the Brexit referendum and later to Brexit negotiations. Many open data advisory bodies ceased to exist or merged with others. For example, the Public Sector Transparency Board became part of the Data Steering Group in November 2015, and the Open Data User Group discontinued its activities entirely in 2015. There have also been political attempts to limit the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) based on the argument that opening up government data would be an adequate substitute. There are still issues around publishing land ownership information across all regions, and some valuable datasets have been transferred out of government ownership avoiding publication, such as the Postal Address File that was sold off during the privatisation of the Royal Mail.”
The UK dropped in the Open Data Barometer rankings in 2017 (the latest data we have), and one of the key commitments from the last National Action Plan to “develop a common data standard for reporting election results in the UK” and improve crucial data on elections results had ‘limited’ progress according to the IRM, demonstrating a poor recent track record from the UK on opening up new datasets where it matters.
So where from here?
I generally prefer my blogging (and engagement) to be constructive. But I’m hoping that sometimes, the most constructive thing to do, is to call out the problems, even when I can’t see a way to solutions. Right now, it feels to me as though the starting point must be to recognise:
[Summary: The Information Commissioner’s Office has upheld an appeal against continued redaction of key financial information about the Javelin Park Incinerator Public Private Partnership (PPP) project in Gloucestershire]
The Story So Far
I’ve written before about controversy over the contract for Javelin Park, a waste incinerator project worth at least £0.5bn and being constructed just outside Stroud as part of a 25-year Public Private Partnership deal. There’s a short history at the bottom of this article, which breaks off in 2015 when the Information Commissioners’ Office last ruled against Gloucestershire County Council (GCC) and told them to release an unredacted copy of the PPP contract. GCC appealed that decision, but were finally told by the Information Tribunal in 2017 to publish the contract: which they did. Sort of. Because in the papers released, we found out about a 2015 renegotiation that had taken place, meaning that we still don’t know how much local taxpayers are on the hook for, nor how the charging model affects potential recycling rates, or incentives to burn plastics.
Tomorrow we’ll be heading to Gloucester in support of Sid’s continued campaign for information, and for action to bring accountability to this mega-project.
It’s against this backdrop that I wanted to draw out some of the key elements of the ICO’s decision notice, and observations on GCC responses to FOI and EIR requests.
It is notable that every request for information relating to Javelin Park has been met with very delayed replies, exceeding the statutory limits set down in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the stricter Environmental Information Regulations (EIR).
The decision notice states that the “council failed to comply with the requirements of Regulation 5(2) and Regulation 14(2)” which set strict time limits on the provision of information, and the grounds for which an authority can take extra time to respond.
Yet, we’re seeing in the latest requests, that GCC suggest that they will need until the end of June (which falls, curiously, just days after the next full meeting of the County Council) to work out what they can release. I suspect consistent breaches of the regulations on timeliness are not likely to be looked on favourably by the ICO in any future appeals.
The information tribunal principles stand
The Commissioners decision notice draws heavily on the earlier Information Tribunal ruling that noted that, whilst there are commercial interests of the Authority, and UBB at play, there are significant public interests in transparency, and:
“In the end it is the electorate which must hold the Council as a whole to account and the electorate are more able to do that properly if relevant information is available to all”
The decision note makes clear that the reasoning applies to revisions to the contract:
Even with the disclosures ordered by the Tribunal from the contract the Commissioner considers that it is impossible for the public to be fully aware of the overall value for money of the project in the long term if it is unable to analyse the full figures regarding costs and price estimates which the council was working from at the time of the revised project plan.
going on to say:
The report therefore provides more current, relevant figures which the council used to evaluate and inform its decisions regarding the contract and it will presumably be used as a basis for its future negotiations over pricing and costs. Currently these figures are not publicly available, and therefore the public as a whole cannot create an overall picture as to whether the EfW development provides value for money under the revised agreement.
As the World Bank PPP Disclosure Framework makes clear, amendment and revisions to a contract are as important as the contract itself, and should be proactively published. Not laboriously dragged out of an authority through repeated trips to information tribunals.
Prices come from markets, not from secrets
A consistent theme in the GCCs case for keeping heavy redactions in the contract is that disclosure of information might affect the price they get for selling electricity generated at the plant. However, the decision notice puts the point succinctly:
Whilst she [the Commissioner] also accepts that if these figures are published third parties might take account of them during negotiations, the main issue will be the market value of electricity at the time that negotiations are taking place.
As I recall from first year economics lectures (or perhaps even GCSE business studies…): markets function better with more perfect information. The energy market is competitive, and there is no reason to think that selective secrecy will distort the market or secure the authority a better deal.
The ICO decision notice is nuanced. It does find some areas where, with the commercial interest of the private party invoked, public interest is not strong enough to lead to disclosure. The Commissioner states:
These include issues such as interest and debt rates and operating costs of UBB which do not directly affect the overall value for money to the public, but which are commercially sensitive to UBB.
This makes some sense. As this decision notice relates to a consultants report on Value for Money, rather than the contract with the public authority, it is possible for there to be figures that do not warrant wider disclosure. However, following the precedent set by the Information Tribunal, the same reasoning would only apply to parts of a contract if they had been agreed in advance to be commercially confidential. As Judge Shanks found, only a limited part of the agreement between UBB and GCC was covered by such terms. Any redactions GCC now want to apply to a revised agreement should start only from consulting contract Schedule 23 on agreed commercial confidential information.
Where next?
GCC have either 28 days to appeal the decision notice, or 35 days to provide the requested information. The document in question is only a 29 page report, with a small number of redactions to remove, so it certainly should not take that long.
Last time GCC appealed to a Tribunal in the case of the 2013 Javelin Park Contract they spent upwards of £400,000 of taxpayers money on lawyers*, only to be told to release the majority of the text. Given the ICO Decision Notice makes clear it is relying on the reasoning of the Tribunal, a new appeal to the tribunal would seem unlikely to succeed.
However, we do now have to wait and see what GCC do, and whether we’ll get to know what the renegotiated contract prices were in 2015. Of course, this doesn’t tell us whether or not there has been further renegotiation, and for that we have to continue to push for proactive transparency and a clear open contracting policy at GCC that will make transparency the norm, rather than something committed local citizens have to fight for through self-sacrificing direct action.
*Based on public spending data payments from Residential Waste Project to Eversheds.
[Summary: Thinking aloud about open data and data standards as governance tools]
There are interesting shifts in the narratives of open data taking place right now.
Earlier this year, the Open Data Charter launched their new stategy: “Publishing with purpose”, situating it as a move on from the ‘raw data now’ days where governments have taken an open data initaitive to mean just publishing easy-to-open datasets online, and linking to them from data catalogues.
The Open Contracting Partnership, which has encouraged governments to purposely prioritise publication of procurement data for a number of years now, has increasingly been exploring questions of how to design interventions so that they can most effectively move from publication to use. The idea enters here that we should be spending more time with governments focussing on their use cases for data disclosure.
The shifts are welcome: and move closer to understanding open data as strategy. However, there are also risks at play, and we need to take a critical look at the way these approaches could or should play out.
In this post, I introduce a few initial thoughts, though recognising these are as yet underdeveloped. This post is heavily influenced by a recent conversation convened by Alan Hudson of Global Integrity at the OpenGovHub, where we looked at the interaction of ‘(governance) measurement, data, standards, use and impact ‘.
(1) Whose purpose?
The call for ‘raw data now‘ was not without purpose: but it was about the purpose of particular groups of actors: not least semantic web reseachers looking for a large corpus of data to test their methods on. This call configured open data towards the needs and preferences of a particular set of (technical) actors, based on the theory that they would then act as intermediaries, creating a range of products and platforms that would serve the purpose of other groups. That theory hasn’t delivered in practice, with lots of datasets languishing unused, and governments puzzled as to why the promised flowering of re-use has not occurred.
Sunlight Foundation recently published a write-up of their engagement with Glendale, Arizona on open data for public procurement. They describe a process that started with a purpose (“get better bids on contract opportunities”), and then engaged with vendors to discuss and test out datasets that were useful to them. The resulting recommendations emphasise particular data elements that could be prioritised by the city administration.
Would Glendale have the same list of required fields if they had started asking citizens about better contract delivery? Or if they had worked with government officials to explore the problems they face when identifying how well a vendor will deliver? For example, the Glendale report doesn’t mention including supplier information and identifiers: central to many contract analysis or anti-corruption use cases.
If we see ‘data as infrastructure’, then we need to consider the appropriate design methods for user engagement. My general sense is that we’re currently applying user centred design methods that were developed to deliver consumer products to questions of public infrastructure: and that this has some risks. Infrastructures differ from applications in their iterability, durability, embeddedness and reach. Premature optimisation for particular data users needs may make it much harder to reach the needs of other users in future.
I also have the concern (though, I should note, not in any way based on the Glendale case) that user-centred design done badly, can be worse than user-centred design done not at all. User engagement and research is a profession with it’s own deep skill set, just as work on technical architecture is, even if it looks at first glance easier to pick up and replicate. Learning from the successes, and failures, of integrating user-centred design approaches into bureacratic contexts and government incentives structures need to be taken seriously. A lot of this is about mapping the moments and mechanisms for user engagement (and remembering that whilst it might help the design process to talk ‘user’ rather than ‘citizen’, sometimes decisions of purpose should be made at the level of the citizenry, not their user stand-ins).
(3) International standards, local adoption
(Open) data standards are a tool for data infrastructure building. They can represent a wide range of user needs to a data publisher, embedding requirement distilled from broad research, and can support interoperabiliy of data between publishers – unlocking cross-cutting use-cases and creating the economic conditions for a marketplace of solutions that build on data. (They can, of course, also do none of these things: acting as interventions to configure data to the needs of a particular small user group).
But in seeking to be generally usable, standard are generally not tailored to particular combinations of local capacity and need. (This pairing is important: if resource and capacity were no object, and each of the requirements of a standard were relevant to at least one user need, then there would be a case to just implement the complete standard. This resource unconstrained world is not one we often find ourselves in.)
How then do we secure the benefits of standards whilst adopting a sequenced publication of data given the resources available in a given context? This isn’t a solved problem: but in the mix are issues of measurement, indicators and incentive structures, as well as designing some degree of implementation levels and flexibility into standards themselves. Validation tools, guidance and templated processes all help too in helping make sure data can deliver both the direct outcomes that might motivate an implementer, whilst not cutting off indirect or alternative outcomes that have wider social value.
(I’m aware that I write this from a position of influence over a number of different data standards. So I have to also introspect on whether I’m just optimising for my own interests in placing the focus on standard design. I’m certainly concerned with the need to develop a clearer articulation of the interaction of policy and technical artefacts in this element of standard setting and implementation, in order to invite both more critique, and more creative problem solving, from a wider community. This somewhat densely written blog post clearly does not get there yet.)
Some preliminary conclusions
In thinking about open data as strategy, we can’t set rules for the relative influence that ‘global’ or ‘local’ factors should have in any decision making. However, the following propositions might act as starting point for decision making at different stages of an open data intervention:
Purpose should govern the choice of dataset to focus on
Standards should be the primary guide to the design of the datasets
User engagement should influence engagement activities ‘on top of’ published data to secure prioritised outcomes
New user needs should feed into standard extension and development
User engagement should shape the initiatives built on top of data
Some open questions
Are there existing theoretical frameworks that could help make more sense of this space?
Which metaphors and stories could make this more tangible?
[Summary: Looking for great candidates to drive progress on Open Government in the UK through the UK Civil Society OGP Steering Committee and Multi-stakeholder Forum. Nomination deadline: 16th April]
Nominations are now open for civil society members of the UK Open Government Partnership (OGP) Multi-stakeholder Forum. It’s a key time for open government in the UK, as we look to maintain momentum and push forward new reforms, within a wider national and global environment where open, participatory and effective governance is increasingly under threat.
Yesterday, members of the current Civil Society Network Steering Committee and other guests were hosted at the Speakers House in Parliament to hear an update from Dr Ben Worthy, the independent reviewer of UK progress. The event underscored the importance of active civil society engagement to put issues on the open government agenda, and the unique opportunity offered by the OGP process to accelerate reforms and support deep dialogue between government and civil society. Ben also challenged those assembled to think about the ‘signature reforms’, engagement experiments and high profile interventions that the next National Action Plan should support, and to look to engage more with Parliament to secure parliamentary scrutiny of transparency and open government policy.
.@opengovuk#ogpIRM The speaker emphasising importance of OGP work on transparency and accountability. Closing words on the need to focus on impacts of open gov for the poorest and most vulnerable in society: open gov for all. pic.twitter.com/YvKTJiTfoc
One of the ways in the UK OGP Civil Society Network we’ve been preparing to meet these challenges is by updating the Terms of Reference for the Civil Society Network Steering Group so that it is ready to act as the civil society half of a standing Multi-stakeholder Forum on Open Government in the UK. This will meet regularly with government, including with Ministers with Open Government responsibility, to secure and monitor open government commitments.
To bring on board a wider set of skills and experience, we’ve also increased the number of places on the Steering Committee, creating five spaces now up for election through an open process that also seeks to secure a good gender balance, and representation of both civil society organisations and independent citizens. I’m personally keen to see us use this opportunity to bring new skills and experience onboard for the Steering Committee and Multi-stakeholder Forum, including people with experience of working on reforms within government (though current government officials working on open gov policy are not eligible to apply), specialists in civic participation, and experts on right to information issues.
Responsibilities of Steering Group members include:
Engaging with the relevant Minister and civil servants with responsibility for the OGP
Participating in the Multistakeholder Forum between government and civil society
Speaking on behalf of the Open Government Network
Supporting and overseeing the work of the Network Coordinator and ensuring the smooth running of the OGN
and to date it’s been a committment of 3 – 15 hours a month (depending on the stage of the National Action Plan process) with a regular Steering Committee call and periodic meetings (usually in London, though we’ve been trying to move around the country whenever possible) with government officials and other members of the civil society network. The nomination form is here if you are interested – and even if you’re not interested in a role on the Steering Committee right now, do join the network via it’s open mailing list for other opportunities to get involved.
As a current Steering Committee member, I’d be happy to answer any questions (@timdavies) about the process and the potential here to take forward open government reforms in the UK, and as part of the 70+ country strong global OGP network.
[Summary: reflections and ideas building on conversations at the OGP National Action Plan workshop in Bristol yesterday with ideas about a fund for scoping studies, strengthening the ICO role around contract disclosure, and better national Management Information (and a continuation of this blog’s ‘Open Contracting’ season: I promise I’ll write about some other things soon!]
*The UK government endorses the principles of open contracting. We will build on the existing foundation of transparency in procurement and contracting and, in consultation with civil society organisations and other stakeholders, we will look at ways to enhance the scope, breadth and usability of published contractual data. *
In 2016, the Open Contracting moved up to slot number 5, with a commitment to:
…implement the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) in the Crown Commercial Service’s operations by October 2016; [and to] begin applying this approach to major infrastructure projects, starting with High Speed Two, and rolling out OCDS across government thereafter.
As we head towards the next National Action Plan in 2018, it’s time to focus on local implementation. Whilst government policies on procurement, and even on asset disposals (e.g. selling off government land), provide clear guidance on transparency and publication of data and documents (including full contract text), local implementation is sorely lacking.
The day after Carillion’s collapse it was only possible to locate less than 30 of the 400+ government contracts with Carillion through the national Contracts Finder dataset. And none had the text of contracts attached. Local authorities continue to invoke ‘commercial confidentiality’ as a blanket reason to keep procurement or asset sale information secret, increasing corruption risks, and undermining opportunities to promote value for money, local economic development and strategic procurement across the public sector.
When policy is good, but implementation is poor, what levers are there? At the recent Bristol workshop we explored a range of opportunities. In general, approaches fall into a few different categories:
Improving enforcement. There are few consequences right now for a government agency that is not following procurement guidance. Although local government is prone to resist new or strengthened requirements that come without funding, there may be opportunities to strengthen regulators, or increase the consequences of non-compliance. However, this often needs to rely on:
Better monitoring. It’s only when we can see which authorities are failing in their procurement transparency obligations, or when we can identify leading and lagging agencies when it comes to use of pre-procurement dialogues for public and supplier engagement, that targeted enforcement of key practices becomes possible. Monitoring alone can sometimes create incentives for improved practice.
Making it easier. Confusion over the meaning of commercial confidentiality may be preventing good practice. Guidance from government, or better design of software tools, can all help streamline the process of complying. Government may have a role in setting the standards for procurement software, as well as the data standards for publishing transparency procurement information.
Show the benefits. The irony of low compliance with procurement best practices on transparency is, well, that best practice is often better. It brings savings, and better services. A programme to demonstrate this has a lot of value.
So, what could this look like in terms of concrete commitments:
Scoping study support fund. Open Contracting has the potential to be win-win-win: efficiency for government, accountability to citizens, and opportunities for local businesses. But building multi-stakeholder support for new initiatives, and setting priorities for local action needs an understanding of the the current situation. Where are the biggest blocks to opening up information on procurement? Are the challenges policy or process? Where will leadership for change come from? How can different stakeholders work together to generate, share and use data and information – and to design better procurement processes? These are all questions that can be answered through a scoping study.
Development Gateway, HIVOS and the Open Contracting Partnership have well-tested scoping study methods that have been used around the world to support national-level Open Contracting initiatives. Adapting this method for city or regional use, and providing kick-start funding to help local partnerships come together, assess their situation, and plan for change, could be a very effective way to catalyse a move from open contracting policy to local, relevant and high-impact practice.
With just £100k investment, Central government could support studies in 10 or more areas.
Improved national metrics. As part of implementation of the last NAP commitment, the Contracts Finder platform now has a (very) basic statistics page, providing an overview of which public authorities are publishing their contracts. With the underlying open data, it’s possible to compute a few more metrics, exploring the kind of contracts different agencies are publishing information on, or assessing gaps between tender and award. However, central government could go a lot further in providing Business Intelligence dashboards on top of the data in Contracts Finder, and publishing much more accessible reports on policy compliance. The OpenTender.eu project demonstrate some of what can be done with the analysis of collated procurement data, calculating a range of indicators.
Empowering the Information Commissioner’s Office. The ICO has a key role in enforcing the public right to information, yet has a substantial backlog of cases, many including FOI requests relating to contracts. Support for the ICO to develop further guidance, monitor compliance and take enforcement activities against authorities who are hiding behind bogus commercial confidentiality arguments, could shift the balance from the current ‘closed by default’ position when it comes to the contract details that matter, to proper implementation of the open-by-default policy.
Extending FOI for contractors. Although the idea that the Freedom of Information Act should apply to any provider of public services, regardless of whether they are public of private sector, is one that has been put forward, and knocked back, in previous National Action Planning processes, it remains as relevant as ever. In light of the recent Carillion Collapse, and with outsourcing arrangements looking increasingly shaky, the public right to know about delivery of public services clearly needs re-asserting more strongly.
Improved model contract clauses. Earlier rounds of the OGP NAP have secured model contract clauses for national government contracts, focussing on provision of performance information. Revisiting the question of model clauses, but with a focus on local government, and on further requirements around transparency of delivery, would offer a parallel route to increase transparency of local service delivery, creating a contractual right to information, pursued alongside efforts to extend the legal right through FOI.
A mix of the commitments above would combine different levers: enforcement, incentives and oversight – with a chance to truly build effective open contracting. Within the wider UK landscape, for the OGP process to remain credible, we will need to see some serious and ambitious commitments, and open contracting is a key area where these could be made.
(Hat-tip to @carla_denyer for the framing of how to motivate government action used in the above, and to all at the Bristol @openGovUK workshop who discussed Open Contracting.)
The legislative requirement to publish most opportunities and awards over £10,000 via the Contracts Finder platform;
The policy committment of central government to see all tender documents, and contract texts attached to those notices on Contracts Finder;
Guidance on all the documents that go to make up the contract (and so that should be attached to Contracts Finder)
Re-iteration of the limitations to redaction of contract documents;
Recommendations on transparency clauses to include in new contracts, to have clear agreement with suppliers over information that will be public.
As contracting transparency policy goes: this is good stuff. We’re not yet at the stage in the UK of having the kind of integrated public financial management systems that give us transparency from planning to final payment, nor are their the kind of lock-in measures such as checking a contract has been published before any invoices against it are paid. But it does provide a clear foundation to build on.
The platform that backs up this policy, Contracts Finder, has also seen some good progress recently. With hundreds of tender and award notices posted every week, it continues to provide good structured data in the Open Contracting Data Standard through an open API. In the last few weeks, the data has also started to capture company registration numbers for suppliers – a really important key to linking up contracting and company ownership information, and to better understanding patterns of public sector contracting. The steady progress of Contracts Finder as a national platform (with a number of features also now added to help capture sub-contracting processes too) makes it absolutely key to monitoring and improving implementation of the policies described above.
There are still some challenges for the platform: data quality (and document availability) for many of the records in Contracts Finder relies upon the features of e-Procurement systems used by departments or local authorities to manage their contracting processes. If these systems don’t encourage inclusion of company identifiers, or contracting documents, we may struggle to reach full policy compliance and the best data quality. Ongoing improvements to the APIs for data entry, and to the tools for monitoring data quality, could certainly help here, as would increased engagement with e-procurement system vendors to get them to bake open contracting into their platforms, as Chris Smith has called for.
However, as we head in 2018, whilst we have to keep working on policy and platforms – the real focus needs to be on implementation: monitoring and motivating each department or public agency to be sure they are not only seeing transparency in procurement as a tick-box compliance excercise, but instead making sure it is embraced as a core part of accountable and open government. To date, Open Contracting in the UK has been the work of a relatively small network of dedicated officials, activists and entrepreneurs. If the vibe at OC Global last month was anything to go by, 2018 may well be the year it moves into the mainstream.
Disclosure/notes
I’m a member of the UK Open Contracting Steering Group, working under Commitment 5 of the UK OGP plan and I work for Open Data Services Co-op as one of the Open Contracting Data Standard helpdesk team.